Fullilove v. Klutznick: Do Affirmative Action
Plans Require Congressional Authorization? by unknown
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 38 | Issue 4 Article 14
Fall 9-1-1981
Fullilove v. Klutznick: Do Affirmative Action Plans
Require Congressional Authorization?
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Contracts Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Fullilove v. Klutznick: Do Affirmative Action Plans Require Congressional Authorization?, 38 Wash. &
Lee L. Rev. 1315 (1981), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol38/iss4/14
FULLILOVE V. KLUTZNICK: DO AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION PLANS REQUIRE CONGRESSIONAL
AUTHORIZATION?
Racial discrimination against minorities has been a persistent
judicial concern.1 Minorities are guaranteed equal rights by the equal
protection component of the fifth amendment,2 and the thirteenth,' four-
teenth,' and fifteenth amendments.5 To enforce the constitutional rights,
Congress has enacted national legislation banning racial discrimination
in employment practices,' educational opportunities,7 and voting rights.'
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that ensuring equal
' See Vieira, Racial Imbalance, Black Separatism, and Permissible Classification by
Race, 67 MICH. L. Rav. 1553, 1553 (1969) (state and federal power to classify by race is one of
primary constitutional concerns). The Supreme Court's review of practices and statutes
which discriminate against racial minorities extends to segregation in public educational
systems, Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 298 (1955); McLaurin v. Oklahoma
State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 638 (1950), to segregation in public railway carriages, Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540 (1896), to discrimination against minorities in state agency
grants of licenses to operate a business, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 365-66 (1886), to
exclusion of a minority from jury duty, Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 340 (1880), and to
state prohibition of relationships between interracial couples, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
2 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 184 (1964).
The fifth amendment guarantees that "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liber-
ty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. AMEND. V.
I The thirteenth amendment states that "neither slavery nor involuntary servitude...
shall exist within the United States .. ." U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIII, § 1. The Supreme Court
has determined that Congress may exercise its enforcement powers under § 2 of the thir-
teenth amendment against acts of private individuals, whether or not state officials sanction
those acts. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438 (1968).
Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment states that "No state shall ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, §
1. The primary purpose of the fourteenth amendment is to eliminate racial discrimination,
but it also offers protection to victims of other types of governmental discrimination. R.
O'NEIL, DISCRIMINATING AGAINST DISCRIMINATION 72 (1975) [hereinafter cited as O'NEILl.
I The fifteenth amendment expressly confronts the racial discrimination issue by en-
suring the "rights of citizens of the United States to vote ... regardless of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude." U.S. CONST. AMEND. XV, § 1. The Supreme Court has
authority to review all cases arising under the Constitution and federal laws. U.S. CONST.
Art. I, § 2.
1 Section 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that it is an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any individual with
respect to hiring, discharge, or terms of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
1 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discriminatory practices in public
education. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). Section 601 of Title VI bans discrimination against or ex-
clusion of any person on the basis of race, color, or national origin in any program or activity
receiving federal funds. Id
, The Voting Rights Act of 1965 prohibits state and political subdivisons from using
any voting practice that denies the right of any citizen to vote on account of race or color. 42
U.S.C. § 1973 (1976).
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opportunity under the laws may require more than prohibition of pur-
poseful discrimination.' The Court has supported preferential treatment
of minorities and affirmative action plans in an attempt to redress the im-
balance of minority participation at all levels of society." Racial
classifications are suspect, however, and subject to strict judicial
scrutiny.1 Case law has not delineated consistent standards to govern
the constitutionality of racial preferences.12 Instead, the Supreme Court
' See Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 761 (1976) (Congress
has authority to prohibit discriminatory conduct that occurred prior to effectiveness of Act);
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 422 (1975) (thrust of Title VII is to remedy con-
sequences of employment practices regardless of employer's discriminatory intent); Lau v.
Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974) (agency may prohibit practices having discriminatory ef-
fects even absent purposeful design to discriminate). See also NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d
614, 617 (5th Cir. 1974) (notwithstanding defendant's motive or intent to discriminate, pre-
sent effects of past discrimination warranted remedial relief).
10 See United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 162
(1977) (legislative reapportionment along racial lines to create black majority voting
districts not unconstitutional); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974) (school district must
give preferential treatment to students with English language deficiency). Preferential
treatment for minorities is the basis for a claim of reverse discrimination. See O'NEIL, supra
note 4, at 72.
Judicial and legislative enactment of affirmative action programs demonstrates
governmental acknowledgement that merely to cease and desist from harmful or proscribed
activity is not enough to provide equal protection of the laws. See Sowell, Weber and
Bakke, and the Presuppositions of "Affirmative Action," 26 WAYNE L. REv. 1309, 1310
(1980). The emphasis of affirmative action recently has tended to shift from equality of op-
portunity toward statistical parity. Id. at 1313. The Supreme Court has held that public
school systems have an affirmative duty to remedy de facto segregation in their school
districts. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971); Green
v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
n Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). The suspect classification stan-
dard developed in response to practices using racial distinctions that discriminated against
minorities. See Wright, Color-Blind Theories and Color-Conscious Remedies, 47 U. CHI. L.
REV. 213, 241 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Wright]; Brest, Forward. In Defense of the Anti-
discrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 16 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Brest]. In Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), Justice Harlan advocated an ab-
solute ban on laws and practices affording disparate treatment to individuals solely on the
basis of race. Id. at 559. Justice Harlan stated that the Constitution is color-blind and will
not tolerate the consideration of a person's color in determining the civil rights of citizens.
Id. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has established that a racial classification may be
upheld if it serves a permissible governmental interest independent of racial discrimination.
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); see McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 41 (1971) (use
of racial classification permissible to eliminate segregated school system). Proponents of af-
firmative action and racial preference maintain that courts should not invoke the strict
scrutiny standard in reviewing a program aimed at aiding rather than oppressing disadvan-
taged racial minorities. See Brest, supra, at 19; Reid, Assault on Affirmative Action: The
Delusion of a Color-Blind America, 23 HoWARD L.J. 381, 399 (1980).
1 Compare Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 479-80 (1980) (Congress may enact
legislation with racial preference as remedial measure) and United Steelworkers of America
v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (agreement between private employer and union to favor
black employees held constitutional) with Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 310 (1978) (public medical school admissions board cannot implement racial
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has decided the question of constitutionality on a case-by-case basis.
When confronting the question, the Court has first inquired whether the
objective of eliminating discrimination is within the power of the body
enacting the racial classification."3 The next inquiry is whether a remedy
using racial or ethnic criteria is a permissible means for eliminating
discrimination.
In Fullilove v. Klutznick,'5 the Supreme Court rejected a constitu-
tional challenge to congressional legislation requiring preferential treat-
ment of minority-owned businesses through a racial quota system.'6 The
challenged legislation was the Public Works Employment Act of 1977.' 7
Section 103(f)(2) of the Act conditions state and local government receipt
of public works grants upon the grantee's assurance that at least 10% of
the amount of each grant will be expended on contracts with minority
business enterprises (MBEs).18 While public contracts normally are
awarded to the lowest bidder, the set-aside provision'9 operates to grant
public works contracts to the lowest bidder that complies with the 10%
set-aside goal.' The administrative program promulgated pursuant to
the Act imposes upon grantees and their prime contractors an affir-
mative duty to seek out and employ available, qualified, and bona fide
MBEs." The MBE provision requires a grantee to offer a public works
preference program) and Central Alabama Paving, Inc. v. James, 499 F. Supp. 629, 636 (N.D.
Ala. 1980) (Department of Transportation regulations establishing a racial preference
classification violative of equal protection guarantees).
Is See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 473 (1980); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978).
" See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 480 (1980) (inquiring whether Congress may
enact racial quota to combat discrimination); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 305 (1978) (Court must decide whether use of racial classification is necessary to ac-
complish elimination bf discrimination in medical school admissions); United Jewish
Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 162 (1977) (reviewing state use of numerical quotas in
reapportioning voting districts along racial lines); Swann v. Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16
(1971) (determining whether federal court may use mathematical ratios to eliminate
segregation in public school system); Wright, supra note 11, at 240.
15 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
Id. at 491-92.
" Public Works Employment Act of 1977, PUB. L. No. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116, 42 U.S.C. §
6701 et seq. (1976 & Supp. H 1978).
11 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (Supp. II 1978). A privately-owned business in which minority
groups own at least 50/a of the stock, or a publicly-owned business in which minority groups
own at least 510/0 of the stock, is a "minority business enterprise." Id. United States citizens
who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Eskimos, Indians, and Aleuts qualify as
minority group members under the Public Works Act. See id.
,1 The 10% set-aside provision requires a grantee of federal funds to award 10% of the
funds received under the grant to minority businesses. 42 U.S.C. 6705(f)(2); see text accom-
panying note 18 supra.
I See 123 CONG. REc. H1437-38 (Feb. 24, 1977) (remarks of Reps. Mitchell and Roe).
2' 42 U.S.C. § 6706 (Supp. H 1978); 13 C.F.R. part 317 (1978); Local Public Works Pro-
gram, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADIIINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ROUND II,
GUIDELINES FOR 10% MINORITY BUSINESS PARTICIPATION IN LPW GRANTS (1977) [hereinafter
cited as GUIDELINES]. An MBE is "available" to work on a project if the project is located in
1981] 1317
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contract only to a prime contractor committed to employing MBEs in at
leAst 10% of the subcontracting work.2 Since the objective of the MBE
provision is to overcome longstanding barriers to minority participation
in public contracting opportunities,' the set-aside provision favors a
higher MBE bid so long as the higher price reflects inflated costs
resulting from past disadvantage and discrimination. 4 The administra-
tive program therefore authorizes the Economic Development Agency
to waive the minority participation requirement where a high minority
business bid is not attributable to the present effects of past discrimina-
tion.25
The plaintiffs in Fullilove were non-minority associations of con-
struction contractors and subcontractors. 6 The complaint alleged that
enforcement of the Public Works Act's MBE requirement caused eco-
nomic injury to the non-minority business plaintiffs.' In addition, the
plaintiffs asserted that the MBE 10% set-aside provision violated the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and the equal pro-
tection element of the due process clause of the fifth amendment.' A
plurality of the Fullilove Court held that the interference with the
business opportunities of non-minority firms caused by the 10% set-
aside program did not render the Act constitutionally defective.' The
Court rejected the alleged equal protection violation on the grounds that
the 1977 Act ensured equal protection of the laws by providing minority
businesses an equal opportunity to participate in federal grants.2
the MBE's market area and the MBE can perform project services, or supply materials
when they are needed. GUIDELINES, supra, at 2-7. An MBE is "qualified" to work on a pro-
ject if it can perform work and supply materials as they are needed. Id The Guidelines
recognize that MBEs which are less qualified than non-minority businesses to perform the
required work will need technical assistance. Id An MBE is "bona fide" if the minority
ownership interests are real and continuing and not created solely to fulfill the 10% MBE
requirement. Id.
I GUIDELINES, supra note 21, at 8. After the grantee awards the public works contract
to a prime contractor committed to hiring MBEs for at least 10% of the subcontracts, the
prime contractor will assume the obligations for fulfilling the 10% MBE goal. Id. at 2.
123 CONG. REC. H1436-37 (Fed. 24, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Mitchell).
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, EDA
MINORITY ENTERPRISE TECHNICAL BULLETIN 5 (1977); see text accompanying notes 36-38 in-
fra (discussing necessity of finding evidence of past discrimination).
25 GUIDELINES, supra note 21, at 15. The absence of sufficient relevant, qualified MBEs
in the market where the project is located justifies an administrative waiver. Id at 13. Only
the grantee can request a waiver. I&. The grantee must show a lack of available, qualified,
bona fide MBEs in the area of the public works project by a detailed explanation of efforts
to locate and enlist MBEs. I&.
448 U.S. at 455.
27 1&
SId; see notes 2, 4 supra (citing relevant parts of fifth and fourteenth amendments).
' 448 U.S. at 484-85. The Fullilove Court conceded that non-minority businesses might
suffer economic injury through loss of contract awards of MBEs, but found that the poten-
tial injury was outweighed by the importance of providing equal protection to minority
businesses. Id
I Id. at 479-80.
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The Fullilove plurality applied a two-step analysis in finding the
Public Works Act's set-aside provision constitutional. The Court initially
addressed the question whether the Constitution granted Congress the
power to enact legislation designed to achieve the objectives stated in
the Act." The Court determined that Congress could enact legislation
pertaining to the activities of private contractors under its power to
regulate interstate commerce.2 Relying on the legislative history of the
Act, the Court found that the historically persistent marked disparity
between the number of public contracts awarded to minority and non-
minority subcontractors provided a rational basis for Congress to con-
clude that the subcontracting practices of prime contractors perpetu-
ated the impaired access of minority businesses to public contracts.,
Congress reasonably could determine that the inequality between
minority and non-minority participation in public contracting had an im-
pact on interstate commerce which triggered a valid exercise of congres-
sional power under the commerce clause.3 4 The Court found that congres-
sional authority to control discriminatory contract procurement prac-
tices of state and local grantees of federal funds arose from Congress'
1 Id at 473. See 123 CONG. REC. H1436-37 (Feb. 24, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Mitchell)
(objective of Public Works Employment Act of 1977 is to ensure minority participation in
public works contracts by use of racial quota). Traditionally, the Supreme Court presumes
the constitutionality of congressional legislation. 448 U.S. at 472; e.g., Columbia Broad-
casting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973). The Court
has recognized, however, that legislation may not extend beyond the powers of Congress.
448 U.S. at 473; 412 U.S. at 103.
2 448 U.S. at 476. The commerce clause empowers Congress to regulate commerce
among the states. U.S. CONST. Art. 1, § 8, c. 3. The Fullilove court initially stated that the
Public Works Employment Act of 1977 was primarily an exercise of Congress' power under
the spending clause. 448 U.S. at 473-74. The spending clause authorizes Congress to provide
for the general welfare. U.S. CONST. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 1. The Court reasoned that the spending
clause gave Congress authority to further legitimate legislative objectives by conditioning
receipt of federal funds upon the recipient's compliance with federal statutory and ad-
ministrative directives. 448 U.S. at 474. The Court was unsure of the objectives attainable
under the spending clause, however, and turned to the regulatory powers of Congress for
constitutional support of its holding. Id at 475. The Court reasoned that Congress' power
under the spending clause was at least as broad as that under the commerce clause. Id. The
Court concluded that if the commerce clause enabled Congress to enact the MBE provision,
then the spending clause provided similar constitutional authority for the set-aside provi-
sion. Id.
" 448 U.S. at 475. The Fullilove Court relied upon the Public Works Act's legislative
history to establish the basis for Congress' conclusion that prior discriminatory practices ac-
counted for the lack of effective minority participation in public contract awards. Id at 477.
The Act's legislative history revealed 35% unemployment in the minority construction sec-
tor. 123 CONG. REC. H1388 (Feb. 23, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Mitchell). In the fiscal year 1976,
federal agencies purchased goods and services worth $68 billion, but minority businesses
received less than 1% of the federal contract receipts. Id at H1389. The Court did not ques-
tion the competence of Congress to make a determination that the disparity in minority and
non-minority contract awards resulted from present effects of past discrimination. 448 U.S.
at 477.
1 Id. at 476.
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power to enforce the equal protection guarantees of the fourteenth
amendment.'5 The Court explicitly stated that Congress may legislate to
remedy discrimination without establishing evidence of specific viola-
tions of anti-discrimination laws.36 The Court noted that judicial and ad-
ministrative proceedings require a compilation of an extensive record
showing evidence of discriminatory conduct.37 Statistics demonstrating
that minority businesses obtained a disparate percentage of public con-
tracts were sufficient to justify Congress' finding that the maintenance
of existing contracting practices of state and local governments denied
MBE's effective participation in federal public works contracts.-
After determining that the congressional objectives behind the
Act's set-aside provision were valid, the Court addressed the question
whether a remedy employing a racial quota was a constitutional means
of accomplishing the Act's objectives.3 9 The Fullilove plurality explicitly
rejected the notion that the Constitution is color-blind and requires ab-
solute racial neutrality in the application of federal and state laws." The
Court emphasized that Congress has broad remedial powers to enforce
equal protection guarantees.41 The Court noted that it had upheld
previously the authority of federal courts to use racial classifications to
redress statutory and constitutional violations of anti-discrimination
laws.42 In addition, the Court referred to its support of state action
Id at 477.
Id The Fullilove Court stated that Congress could enact legislation to remedy racial
discrimination without compiling an extensive record of existing discrimination. Id. Never-
theless, the Court found that Congress had abundant evidence from which to conclude that
non-minority contractors perpetuated the present effects of past discrimination. Id
1 Id- The requirement that courts and administrative agencies establish a record of
discriminatory conduct before attempting to redress discrimination stems from the nature
of their remedial powers. Both courts and agencies consider only the evidence the particular
parties produce in determining whether anti-discrimination laws have been violated. Id at
502-03 (Powell, J., concurring). Congress, on the other hand, combats discrimination on a na-
tional scale and should not be required to make specific factual findings of discriminatory
conduct. Id. Congress relies upon its own information and expertise and facts or opinions
from any source in fulfilling its representative role. Id.
Id. at 477-78. Congress was competent to conclude that the problem of past
discrimination in public contracts awards was national in scope. Id. at 478. The FuUilove
Court found no basis for disputing Congress' conclusion that the disparity in contract
awards did not result from a lack of capable and qualified minority businesses. Id at 477-78.
" The Fullilove Court was responding to the plaintiffs' claim that the MBE provision
deprived non-minority businesses of public contracting opportunities without due process of
law. Id at 455, 473. The Court specified the equal protection component of the due process
clause of the fifth amendment as the relevant constitutional guarantee for review of the
MBE provision. Id.
0 Id. at 482; see note 11 supra. See also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 522-23
(1980) (Steward, J., and Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Constitution forbids racial discrimination
against people of any race).
" See 448 U.S. at 483.
42 Id. at 483. The Court in Fullilove noted that federal courts have the power to incor-
porate racial criteria in order to remedy constitutional and statutory anti-discrimination
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employing racial criteria in order to comply with federal voting rights
legislation, even in the absence of a constitutional violation."3 The Court
reasoned that Congress' constitutional power to declare certain conduct
violative of equal protection, combined with its comprehensive remedial
powers, gave Congress the authority to compel state action to eradicate
that conduct. Furthermore, Congress may enact narrowly-drawn reme-
dial legislation which uses a racial quota and requires parties not guilty
of any purposeful discrimination to share the burden of curing the effect
of prior discrimination. 5
Justice Powell, concurring in Fullilove, applied the standard enun-
ciated by the Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 8 majority
to conclude that the 10% MBE set-aside provision was constitutional."
Under the Bakke text, a racial classification in a remedial measure is un-
constitutional unless the classification is necessary to further a compel-
ling governmental interest.' A compelling governmental interest does
not arise unless the governmental body promulgating the racial prefer-
ence remedy has the authority to find and has found an actual occur-
rence of discrimination in violation of a statutory or constitutional man-
date against discrimination. 9 If a court finds a compelling governmental
interest, the court will proceed to determine whether the racial
classification is a lermissible means of advancing that interest.' The
violations. Id.; see, e.g., North Carolina Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 46 (1971)
(court's use of racial criteria to assign students to schools as means of remedying racial
segregation in public schools held constitutional).
" 448 U.S. at 483; see United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 162 (1977)
(state may use race as basis for reapportionment of voting districts in order to avoid abridg-
ing right to vote).
448 U.S. at 483-84.
Id at 484; see note 71 infra. The Court noted that the burden imposed upon non-
minority businesses by the 10% set-aside provision was relatively small. Id The program's
goal of 10% minimum MBE participation would account for only 0.25% of the annual expen-
diture for construction work in the United States. Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F.2d 600, 607 (2d
Cir. 1978).
11 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
'7 See 448 U.S. at 496 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id.; 438 U.S. at 308-09. The government has a legitimate interest in remedying the
effects of identified discrimination. 448 U.S. at 497. Racial preference is permissible,
however, only when violation of a constitutional or statutory anti-discrimination mandate
has occurred. Id. at 498. A finding of discrimination therefore must precede legislative
enactment of remedial statutes using a racial preference. Id.
'1 448 U.S. at 498; 438 U.S. at 309.
1 Id. at 510. Justice Powell concluded that the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments
gave Congress the power to select any reasonable remedy consistent with the guarantees of
those amendments. Id Justice Powell stated that the judiciary was responsible for review-
ing the remedy to determine through a balancing of minority and non-minority interests
whether a less intrusive means might fulfill the compelling state interest. Id. Justice
Powelrs "equitable and reasonably necessary" test afforded Congress the discretion
necessary to carry out its objectives while preserving judicial review of racial classifica-
tions. Id
1981] 1321
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need to invoke the commerce power or to regulate state and local use of
federal funds does not arise unless discrimination exists." Thus, Justice
Powell correctly stated that the threshold question in determining
whether Congress may remedy discrimination was the authority of Con-
gress to make a valid finding of discrimination." Justice Powell found
that Congress was competent to make findings of unlawful discrimina-
tion.' In addition, Justice Powell found that since Congress had
reasonably determined that private and governmental discrimination
contributed to the disproportionate percentage of public contracts
awarded minority contractors, a compelling governmental interest ex-
isted. 4 Since the 100/o set-aside was a remedy reasonably necessary to
redress identified past discrimination, Justice Powell concluded that the
racial quota did not render the MBE provision constitutionally
defective.5
The Fullilove Court's conclusion that the objectives of the MBE pro-
vision were within the power of Congress is consistent with existing
case law." The Court has acknowledged frequently congressional au-
thority to enact legislation prohibiting discriminatory practices against
racial minorities. 7 The Court has upheld the constitutionality of congres-
sional efforts to eradicate both overt discrimination" and laws that are
facially neutral but have a discriminatory impact on minorities." The
51 See note 48 supra. The Fullilove Court recognized that discrimination must be pre-
sent in order for the subcontracting practices of prime contractors to have the impact upon
interstate commerce prerequisite to Congress' exercise of its commerce power. 448 U.S. at
475.
See 448 U.S. at 498.
Id at 502.
Id at 503. Justice Powell reasoned that the Court's finding of Congressional authority
to remedy discrimination in any particular case implied the Court's belief that Congress had
the authority to identify discrimination and had identified discrimination, regardless of
whether the Court had specifically addressed those two questions. At at 501.
1 Id at 516-17.
" See text accompanying notes 57-63 infra.
51 E.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 132 (1970) (1970 Voting Rights Amendments
barring literacy tests held constitutional); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966)
(Congress has authority to prohibit discriminatory practices of state and federal govern-
ments); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (Civil Rights Act of 1964 pro-
hibiting discrimination in privately-owned businesses affecting interstate commerce held
constitutional).
I See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (Congress may prohibit discriminatory private
business activities that obstruct interstate commerce).
" See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177, (1980) (Congress has power to
prohibit perpetuation of prior purposeful discrimination even though practices have
discriminatory effects only); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (Title VII of
Civil Rights Act held constitutional although Act aimed at discriminatory consequences and
not at discriminatory intent); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652 (1967) (Congress may
eliminate facially neutral state law having discriminatory impact on minority voting rights);
Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 153 (1965) (state voter registration test having
discriminatory effect on racial minority held unconstitutional).
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pervasiveness of past discrimination and of the resulting racial im-
balance in society has convinced the Court that Congress may act to
combat present practices that perpetuate the effects of longstanding
barriers to minority participation in economic, social, and political oppor-
tunities." If the Court perceives a rational basis from which to conclude
that a discrimination problem is national in scope, the Court will reject a
challenge to Congress' authority to exercise its anti-discrimination func-
tion." A long record of marked disparity between minority and non-
minority participation in a particular activity has constituted an ade-
quate evidentiary basis for finding a violation of constitutional or
statutory anti-discrimination provisions.2 Thus, Congress has the
authority to employ means to remedy discrimination without a prior
judicial case-by-case determination of intentional or other unlawful
discrimination.
6 3
The distinctiveness of the Fullilove result lies in the Supreme
Court's sanction of Congress' use of a racial quota as a means of redress-
ing racial discrimination.64 The Court recognized that a distinction based
on race in any legislative, administrative, or judicial decision is subject
I See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 761 (1976) (congressional
legislation may operate to eradicate practices that perpetuate effects of discrimination oc-
curring prior to effective date of enactment); Sedler, Racial Preference and the Constitu-
tion: The Societal Interest in the Equal Participation Objective, 26 WAYNE L. R~v. 1227,
1235 (1980) (fourteenth amendment's broad purpose includes overcoming present effects of
long history of racism) [hereinafter cited as Sedler].
61 See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 133-34 (1970); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641, 653 (1967); text accompanying notes 34, 35 & 38 supra.
I See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40
n.20 (1977) (evidence of racial imbalance to prove discrimination not precluded under Title
VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964); Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 148-50 (1964)
(disproportionate percentage of registered black voters justified judicial finding that state
law requiring interpretation of Constitution clause prior to voter registration had effect of
discriminating against blacks).
'3 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 327-28 (1966).
" See 448 U.S. at 480; Comment, Federal Efforts to Assist Minority Construction Con-
tractors: The Need for Comprehensive Planning, 14 U.C.D. L. REv. 125, 141 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Federal Efforts]. Prior to Fullilove, several lower courts had sustained
the constitutionality of the MBE provision of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977.
See Constructors Association of Western Pennsylvania v. Kreps, 573 F.2d 811, 817-18 (3d
Cir. 1978); Rhode Island Chapter, Associated General Contractors of America, Inc. v. Kreps,
450 F. Supp. 338, 349 (D.R.I. 1978); Carolinas Branch, Associated General Contractors of
America, Inc. v. Kreps, 442 F. Supp. 392, 399 (D.S.C. 1977). See also Associated General
Contractors of Massachusetts v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9, 20 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 957 (1974) (state legislature requiring maintenance of fixed percentage of racial
minorities among contractor employees held constitutional). But see Associated General
Contractors of California v. Secretary of Commerce, 441 F. Supp. 955, 966 (C.D. Cal. 1977),
vacated and remanded for consideration of mootness, 438 U.S. 909 (1978), on remand, 459 F.
Supp. 766 (C.D. Cal.), appeal docketed sub nom., Armistead v. Associated General Contrac-
tors of California, No. 78-1107 (conditioning grant of federal funds on race under MBE provi-
sion of Public Works Employment Act of 1977 for purpose of remedying discrimination not
permissible governmental objective).
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to strict judicial scrutiny. 5 Nevertheless, the Fullilove Court's decision
to sustain congressional authority to redress discrimination through
racial preference is a sound result. A racial classification may pass con-
stitutional muster if it is necessary to further a permissible government
objective.6 The Court has permitted legislative and administrative
enactment of remedial measures that provide preferential treatment to
minorities for the purpose of redressing identified discrimination. 7 Fur-
thermore, the Court has upheld the legality of a private, voluntary, race-
conscious affirmative action plan that employs a racial quota. 8 Given the
broad remedial powers of Congress 9 and judicial support of racial
classifications in private, administrative, and state legislative remedial
measures," the Court's refusal to deny relief merely because racial quota
requirements may burden individuals not guilty of any discrimination is
consistent with existing case law. 1
While both the Fullilove plurality opinion and Justice Powell's con-
curring opinion emphasized that the Court was reviewing congressional
power to prohibit discrimination, neither opinion explicitly gave Con-
gress the exclusive authority to remedy discrimination by means of a
racial quota.72 Nevertheless, at least one judicial decision has interpreted
the Fullilove holding to restrict to Congress the power to require
disparate treatment on the basis of race. In Central Alabama Paving,
Inc. v James," the United States District Court of Alabama held that
448 U.S. at 472; see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
See United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1977); Board of
Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 46 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
" See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974) (administrative remedy for discrimina-
tion in public education); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652-53 (1966) (federal
legislative remedy to ensure minority voting rights).
See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 433 U.S. 193, 208 (1979).
6 National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., Inc., 337 U.S. 582, 603
(1949) (courts pay great deference to Congress' choice of means to carry out functions).
" See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (private
employer enacted racial quota to increase black craftsmen among work force); United
Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 162 (1977) (state legislature used quota to
establish black minority voting districts); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 567 (1974) (HEW pro-
mulgated regulations granted preferential treatment to minority school children).
" See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 775 (1976) (remedy for past dis-
crimination against minority employees that affects interests of non-minority employees
is presumptively necessary); Sedler, supra note 60, at 1243-44 (racial preference to advance
equal participation objective is valid notwithstanding detriment to white individuals). White
individuals sharing the burden of redressing past discrimination against minorities is
equitable when necessary to remedy that discrimination. 424 U.S. at 777. The rationale
behind requiring sharing of the burden is that some non-minority businesses may have gained
competitive advantage during the long history of discrimination against minority
businesses, in access to contracting opportunities. 448 U.S. at 484-85. But see Regents of
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1977) (unconstitutional to employ racial preference
that injures rights of individuals not guilty of discrimination when no compelling govern-
mental interest exists).
" See 448 U.S. at 483-84; 448 U.S. at 510 (Powell, J., concurring).
" 499 F. Supp. 629 (N.D. Ala. 1980).
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Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations requiring states to set
aside a fixed percentage of federally funded highway construction con-
tracts for female- and minority-owned businesses violated the equal pro-
tection clause of the fifth amendment.7 4 Although the court recognized
that Fullilove bound the judiciary to uphold the constitutionality of an
MBE provision enacted after a congressional finding of discrimination,
the court decided that Fullilove did not extend to an administratively
authorized race-conscious measure. 7 To determine whether the adminis-
trative agency could establish a preferential classification, the court first
inquired whether Congress had granted the DOT authority to enact
race-conscious remedial measures.7 6 Since the DOT had not received con-
gressional authorization to impose a racial preference to remedy dis-
crimination in the highway construction industry, the court found that
the set-aside regulations denied non-minority businesses equal protec-
tion."' The court did not specify the circumstances that would constitute
a valid congressional authorization to an administrative agency. 8 The
court found inadequate the DOT's attempt to find congressional author-
ization for its set-aside provision in federal statutory prohibitions of
discrimination in areas other than the highway construction industry."
7' Id. at 636. The court found that the plaintiff highway contractors might suffer ir-
reparable harm from implementation of the challenged DOT regulations, and granted a
preliminary injunction. Id. at 632.
,1 Id. at 636. See also Federal Efforts, supra note 64, at 154 n.133 (Fullilove restricted
to Congress authority to determine whether racially dependent set-aside is best or only
means of enabling MBEs to compete equally with non-minority businesses).
The District Court for the District of Delaware has declined recently to interpret
Fullilove to forbid administrative enactment of an MBE provision absent congressional
authorization. See Pettinaro Construction Co., Inc. v. Delaware Authority for Regional
Transit (DART), 500 F. Supp. 559, 565 (D. Del. 1980). In Pettinaro, the plaintiff was the low
bidder on a construction project for DART, but did not receive the contract because the
plaintiff failed to comply with a 15% minority set-aside requirement. 500 F. Supp. at 560.
The court refused to grant plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that a
genuine dispute existed concerning whether a legitimate finding of prior discrimination by a
competent body (DART) supported the racial preference. Id. at 564-65. The Pettinaro court
was unwilling to hold that Fullilove limited to Congress the authority to identify discrimina-
tion prior to the promulgation of a remedial program using a fixed racial quota. Id. DART
maintained that it was acting pursuant to directives of federal administrative agencies. Id.
at 564. The parties agreed that the two requirements for a constitutional MBE provision
under Fullilove were a valid judicial, legislative, or administrative finding of perpetuation
of unlawful past discrimination and a narrowly drawn remedy. Id. at 562.
, 499 F. Supp. at 636. Congress had not delegated to the DOT authority to make find-
ings of discrimination. Id. at 637.
" Id. at 636-37.
," See id. at 637-38.
"1 449 F. Supp. at 637-38. The Central Alabama Paving court found no congressional
authorization for the DOT regulations since none of the enabling statutes dealt with
discrimination in the construction industry. IM; see 23 U.S.C. § 140 (1976) (requiring states
receiving federal highway funds to assure absence of racial discrimination in employment
for highway projects); 40 U.S.C. § 471 et seq. (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (providing for procure-
ment of property and services for federal agencies); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976) (prohibition of
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Supreme Court cases involving preferential treatment of minorities
provide some support for the view adopted by the Central Alabama Pav-
ing court that only Congress may enact or authorize the promulgation of
a racial preference to combat discrimination." Justice Powell, concurring
in Fullilove, stated that the Court refused to uphold the racial
preference program challenged in Bakke because the state governmen-
tal body imposing the race-conscious remedy had no authority to act in
response to identified discrimination.8 1 In Bakke, the Court found un-
constitutional a public medical school admissions program that set aside
a fixed quota of the available positions in the entering class for racial
minorities. 2 The Bakke Court reasoned that no compelling governmental
interest in remedying discrimination existed unless the body promul-
gating the remedial measure had the power to identify and prohibit dis-
crimination 83 The Court stated that a medical school admissions board
was not competent to determine that discrimination existed or to fashion
preventative remedies, in the absence of congressional authorization.8
In addition, the Bakke Court's statement that its decision did not ques-
tion the validity of congressionally authorized administrative actions
providing preferential treatment to minorities implies that an adminis-
trative agency may remedy discrimination only upon express congres-
sional authorization."
Lau v. Nichols8 is consistent with the holding in Central Alabama
Paving that only Congress may authorize administrative use of racial
discriminatory practices in any program receiving federal funds); 45 U.S.C. § 803 (1976Y (pro-
hibiting racial discrimination in railroad projects receiving federal aid); 49 U.S.C. §
1602a(2)(A) (Supp. II 1978) (denying federal assistance to urban mass transportation projects
having discriminatory contract procurement practices); 49 U.S.C. § 1711 et seq. (1976 &
Supp. II 1978) (providing federal aid for development of public airports).
See text accompanying notes 81-94 infra.
" 448 U.S. at 498; 438 U.S. at 309.
438 U.S. at 309-10. Bakke answered the question left open in DeFunis v. Odegaard,
416 U.S. 312 (1974) (per curiam). In DeFunis, the Court did not reach the merits of the issue
whether a racial preference program in the admissions program of a state university law
school violated constitutional equal protection guarantees. 416 U.S. at 319-20.
1 438 U.S. at 309. If a governmental body has no authority to determine past
discrimination, it cannot find constitutional or statutory violations to support a compelling
governmental interest in benefiting one group of individuals over another. I& at 308-09. The
Bakke Court characterized a medical school board's function as educational in nature and
stated that the board could not formulate legislative policy or adjudicate claims of illegality.
I& at 309. Justice Powell nevertheless argued in Fullilove that a state university has a com-
pelling interest in acquiring a diverse student body. 448 U.S. at 498. A fixed admission
quota was not, however, an appropriate method to achieve a diverse student body. Id. The
quota system eliminated some non-minority applicants from consideration for a specified
number of positions, while allowing minority students to compete for all available seats. Id.
In adopting race as the sole determining factor for admissions, the board's remedy was not
fashioned narrowly to fulfill the goal of a diverse student body. IM
438 U.S. at 309.
See id at 302 n.41.
414 U.S. 563 (1974).
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quotas to redress discrimination. In Lau, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of HEW regulations requiring school districts which
received federal funds to take affirmative action to ensure that ethnic
and racial minority children were not denied effective participation in
the educational system because of an inability to speak and understand
English." The Court found the racial preference constitutionally per-
missible because HEW had acted pursuant to express congressional au-
thorization to eliminate discrimination against racial minorities in
federally assisted school systems.88
The Central Alabama Paving court's assertion that Congress must
authorize the implementation of racial quotas is consistent with the
Supreme Court's treatment of a private employer's enactment of a racial
quota. In United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,89 the Court held
that the ban in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against racial
discrimination in employment practices did not forbid a private em-
ployer and a union from voluntarily agreeing upon an affirmative action
plan giving preferential treatment to minorities." The challenged plan
reserved for black employees 50% of the openings in a training program
until the percentage of black craftsmen in the plant approximated the
percentage of blacks in the local labor force." The Court found that the
private, voluntary, race-conscious plan, aimed at elimination of an ex-
isting racial imbalance in employment opportunities, was entirely consis-
tent with the goals of Title VII 2 The Weber Court noted that Title VII
did not require employers to grant preferential treatment to minorities
although a de facto racial imbalance existed in the employer's work
force. 3 The Court inferred from the Act's language that Congress did
8, I at 569. The relevant HEW guidelines state that a school district must take affir-
mative steps to compensate for English language deficiency of ethnic and racial minority
children to ensure their effective participation in the educational system. 35 Fed. Reg. 11595
(1970). The Lau Court noted that mere provision for the same facilities, textbooks, teachers
and curriculum to students who did not understand English did not put them on an equal
footing with English speaking students. 416 U.S. at 566.
" 416 U.S. at 566-67; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976) (authorizing HEW to issue rules re-
quiring school districts to rectify language deficiencies of minority children); note 7 supra.
N 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
91 IM at 208; see note 6 supra (relevant Title VII provisions).
81 443 U.S. at 197. Although Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747
(1976), involved a grant of preferential treatment to minority employees by a private
employer, the remedy did not constitute an affirmative action plan where a competent
judicial, legislative, or administrative body had made no finding of discrimination. 424 U.S.
at 751 (District Court found that Bowman had engaged in pattern of racial discrimination);
see Brest, supra note 11, at 39 (Franks does not involve racial preference remedy because
employer had discriminated against particular plaintiffs).
2 443 U.S. at 208; see 110 CONG. REc. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) (goal of
Title VII to increase employment opportunities of blacks requires upgrading of black oc-
cupational skills through education and training).
1 443 U.S. at 205 n.5; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1976). Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, the statute considered in Bakke, contains no provision comparable to that in Title
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not intend to prohibit private affirmative action to combat the present
effects of past discrimination in employment opportunities. 4 Thus, Con-
gress' implied authorization of remedial measures in Title VII appears to
sustain the constitutionality of private, voluntary affirmative action
plans after Fullilove and Central Alabama Paving.
The Central Alabama Paving court also relied on the DOT's failure
to show that the favored minority groups suffered from the present ef-
fects of past discrimination, in holding that the set-aside regulations
were unconstitutional." The court required the administrative agency to
engage in a fact-finding procedure to determine the existence of dis-
crimination in the highway construction industry." The Fullilove Court,
on the other hand, found that Congress' conclusion that the racial
disparity in minority participation in public contracts resulted from past
discrimination was sufficient identification of discrimination to sustain
congressional legislation against constitutional challenge." Where Con-
gress has delegated the authority to remedy discrimination to an ad-
ministrative agency, therefore, courts will require the agency to make
findings of fact on a case-by-case basis in order to ensure that the broad
congressional finding of past discrimination authorizes remedial action
in each case. 8
In Perini Corp. v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority"
(MBTA), the United States District Court for the District of Massachu-
setts addressed the issue of the adequacy of a finding of discrimination
in reviewing the constitutionality of an MBE set-aside provision
VII implicitly or explicitly stating that a public educational institution may enact a quota to
redress a racial imbalance in the school's student population. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(1976) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1976). The Weber Court declared that Congress did not in-
tend to incorporate the fifth and fourteenth amendment guarantees into Title VII since Con-
gress enacted the provision pursuant to the commerce power. 443 U.S. at 206 n.6. Title VII
does not require private employers to remedy a racial imbalance without a prior judicial
finding of discrimination. Id. at 205 n.5.
" 443 U.S. at 208; see Wright, supra note 11, at 299 (after Weber and Bakke private
employers may enact affirmative action plans absent any judicial, administrative, or con-
gressional finding of discrimination).
"5 499 F. Supp. at 638. The Central Alabama Paving court adopted both elements of
the "compelling governmental interest" test enunciated in Bakke. Id. at 636; see text accom-
panying note 49 supra. The DOT failed to show that the regulations were fashioned narrowly
to eradicate the effects of past discrimination. 499 F. Supp. at 639. The court found no
evidence that the DOT had considered the appropriateness or effectiveness of the set-aside
requirement over alternative means of remedying discrimination, before enacting the set-
aside provision. Id.. 499 F. Supp. at 639. The court did not decide whether a reasonable basis existed for
the DOT to conclude that past discrimination existed against minority businesses in the
highway construction industry. Compare 499 F. Supp. at 638-39 with 448 U.S. at 477-78 and
text accompanying notes 34, 35 & 38 supra.
448 U.S. at 477-78.
See id. at 478.
No. 77-2340-MC (D. Mass. September 20, 1980) summarized at [1980] 855 FED. CON-
TRACT REP. A-5.
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established by a state transportation agency. 00 The MBTA conditioned
receipt of contract awards for construction of a transportation terminal
upon the general contractors' assurance that minority-owned businesses
would perform at least 30% of the subcontracting work.10' The plaintiff
was the low bidder on a construction contract, but did not receive the
contract award because the company did not agree to employ MBEs to
perform 30% of the subcontracting work."0 2 The court granted summary
judgment for the plaintiff on the grounds that the MBTA had made no
finding of past discrimination against minority contractors."3 The court
rejected MBTA's reliance upon congressional and other legislative and
administrative findings of discrimination throughout the construction in-
dustry to justify an affirmative action program using a racial quota."' In
the absence of an MBTA factual finding of past discrimination, the court
declined to find that the set-aside provision served a compelling state in-
terest in remedying identified past discrimination." 5
The Court's reasoning in Bakke also supports the position that an ad-
ministrative agency must make a factual finding before employing a
racial quota. In Bakke, the Court found that even if the school board had
the competence to identify discrimination it did not determine that the
university had engaged in a discriminatory practice. 0 ' The Bakke Court
asserted that the Supreme Court never had approved preferential classi-
fications without proved constitutional or statutory discrimination viola-
101 See id. at A-5.
,0, No. 77-2340-MC at A-5.
102 Id. In Perini, the MBTA conceded that Perini was not responsible for the company's
failure to comply with the MBE requirements. Id Perini claimed that the MBE provision
constituted an impermissible racial quota and a violation of constitutional equal protection
and due process guarantees. Id. In addition, Perini asserted that the MBTA's imposition of a
racial quota was unconstitutional under Bakke. Id. Perini argued that the MBTA lacked the
authority to identify discrimination requiring a remedy. Id. Finally, Perini argued that the
MBTA had failed to show the existence of prior racial discrimination. Id Thus, the MBTA
set-aside provision did not pass the compelling state interest test of Bakke. Id.; see text ac-
companying notes 48-50 supra.
"0 No. 77-2340-MC at A-5. The Perini court noted that the MBTA had prepared a
report on past discrimination within the construction contract industry more than a year
after the agency enacted the MBE provision. Id. The MBTA's subsequent attempt to justify
the program, however, did not constitute a finding of past discrimination. Id.
"u Id. The Perini court stated that every affirmative action plan using a racial quota re-
quired individual scrutiny, and that the agency establishing an affirmative action program
must make its own findings of past discrimination. Id. According to the court, the MBTA
should have considered whether minority contractors were in fact victims of constitutional
violations or discrimination in the award of MBTA contracts, and whether a 300/0 set-aside
was a reasonable means of redressing identified discrimination. Id.
,"s Id. The Perini court did not address explicitly the issue whether the program would
be valid if MBTA had made the necessary factual finding of discrimination. Id. The court
noted, however, that MBTA's minority participation goal approximated the minority
population percentage in its service area and therefore appeared to be a reasonable
response to a discrimination problem. Id. at A-6.
III 438 U.S. at 309; 448 U.S. at 498 (Powell, J., concurring).
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tions.1 7 Since the medical school's implementation of a racial quota did
not respond to identified past discrimination, the remedial measure served
no compelling governmental interest."8
Commentators have asserted that the rationale supporting the legal-
ity of affirmative action plans is that non-governmental and governmen-
tal bodies can rely on a presumption of pervasive societal discrimination
to authorize racial quotas."9 The Supreme Court in Bakke, however,
specifically rejected the notion that societal discrimination justified a
governmental implementation of a racial classification which imposed
disadvantages on non-minority individuals."1 Although the Weber Court
found that the purposes of Title VII and of affirmative action plans were
consistent, the Court expressly declined to define the boundary between
permissible and impermissible affirmative action plans."1 Supreme
Court cases indicate that administrative agency affirmative action is
permissible only when a governmental body competent to identify and
combat discrimintion has authorized the agency to take remedial mea-
sures to redress a violation of a constitutional or statutory right.'
Although the Fullilove Court did not explicitly decide whether Congress
was the only governmental body competent to authorize redress of dis-
1" 438 U.S. at 307. The Bakke Court asserted that programs having distinctions based
on race or ethnic background must undergo a judicial determination that the remedy plac-
ing a burden on an individual bebause of his race is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
government interest. Id. at 299.
1I Id. at 308-09. The Bakke Court maintained that a state has a legitimate and substan-
tial interest in eliminating the continuing effects of past discrimination, but that the state
cannot remedy discrimination on the grounds of eliminating societal discrimination. Id. at
310.
" See Sindler, Racial Preference Policy, the Political Process, and the Courts, 26
WAYNE L. REV. 1205, 1225 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Sindler]. The issue in determining the
constitutionality of an affirmative action plan is whether pervasive societal discrimination is
a permissible basis for allowing institutions not themselves guilty of past racial discrimina-
tion to implement a racial preference that will help to offset disadvantages suffered by
racial minority groups. Id. at 1225. Commentators have argued that a presumption of legality
should exist when a non-minority group voluntarily chooses to provide minorities with
preferential treatment to its detriment. See Wright, supra note 11, at 234-35; Ely, The Con-
stitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Cn. L. REV. 723, 727 (1974).
110 438 U.S. at 310. The Bakke Court was reluctant to allow governmental institutions
to rely upon societal discrimination as the basis for a racial preference program disadvan-
tageous to individuals not themselves responsible for the harm allegedly suffered by the
minority applicants to the special admissions program. Id. The Court refused to convert the
racial preference remedy previously reserved for constitutional violations into a remedy
that any educational institution could implement without making findings of past
discrimination. Id.
"' See 443 U.S. at 208. The Weber Court found that the purpose of both Title VII and
the affirmative action plan was to eradicate traditional patterns of racial segregation. Id. In
addition, the plan did not unnecessarily interfere with white employees' interests, and was a
temporary measure not intended to maintain a continuous racial balance in the employer's
work force. Id.
"I See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 309; Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. at
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crimination by means of a racial quota, Central Alabama Paving held
that Fullilove stood for that proposition. 1 3 The Supreme Court's analysis
in Lau and Bakke supports the contention that administrative agencies
cannot remedy racial discrimination in the absence of congressional
authorization.
14
While Congress' power to identify discrimination and promulgate
racially preferential remedies is significantly greater than that of the
judiciary,"' court-ordered remedies containing racial preferences are
constitutionally permissible."' Furthermore, courts may sanction affir-
mative action remedial plans formulated by other governmental bodies."1
The Supreme Court also has supported a state legislature's employment
of a racial classification to improve minority representation in the state
legislature."' A state legislature's power to remedy discrimination
should include the power to delegate its authority to state agencies."'
Thus, the scope of the Central Alabama Paving holding should be limited
to requiring federal agencies to act pursuant to congressional mandate.
Courts, state legislatures, and private employers appear competent to
redress discrimination without specific or explicit congressional
authorization. 0
The Supreme Court has held the judiciary and administrative agen-
cies to a more stringent evidentiary standard than Congress in satisfy-
"' See text accompanying notes 72 & 75 supra.
I" See note 112 supra.
1,5 448 U.S. at 483; Rhode Island Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors v. Kreps, 450 F.
Supp. 338, 353-54 (D.R.I. 1978).
"' See Swann v. Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31 (1971) (federal district court may fashion
racial preference remedy that employs racial quota to combat discrimination in public
schools); Wright, supra note 11, at 228.
' See Swann v. Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1971); Green v. County School Bd., 391
U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
,,8 See United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 168 (1977). In Carey, the
New York legislature enacted a voting redistricting plan to enable black voters to achieve a
majority population in two voting districts. Id. at 152. At the same time, a Jewish community
that was reassigned to an adjoining district claimed that the effectiveness of its vote was
diluted by the reassignment. Id. at 152-53. The Carey Court rejected plaintiffs' argument
that the state was denying them the right to vote on account of race, and held that a reap-
portionment using a racial quota was not violative of the fourteenth and fifteenth amend-
ment due process and equal protection guarantees. Id- at 162.
,, In stating that a non-political governmental body should not be able to impose a
racial quota in the absence of legislative mandates, the Bakke Court implied that state
legislative authorization might justify the implementation of a racial quota by such a body.
See 438 U.S. at 309. See also Sindler, supra note 109, at 1223 (school faculty may not decide
alone to establish special admissions quotas, because resort to affirmative action is political
and not educational question). Thus, attempts to provide preferential treatment to
minorities should involve the direct participation of a politically accountable body such as
Congress or a state legislature. Id- at 1225-26. Furthermore, a legislative decision to use a
racial preference to remedy present effects of past discrimination should indicate to courts
that the remedy is constitutional. Id
'1 See text accompanying notes 93-94 supra; notes 116 & 118 supra.
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ing the identification of discrimination requirement.12 1 Thus, the Central
Alabama Paving and Perini courts correctly held that an agency must
show that the minority group receiving preferential treatment has suf-
fered from past discrimination, before implementing a racial quota."=
Judicial acceptance of a "manifest racial imbalance" as adequate
evidence of past discrimination, however, facilitates the identification of
present effects of prior discrimination which is a prerequisite to a con-
stitutional racial preference." Furthermore, the authority or authoriza-
tion to combat discrimination implies the power to enact a suitable
remedy to effectuate that purpose.2 Thus, courts, administrative agen-
cies, state legislatures, and private employers should be able to imple-
ment a racial quota if the authority to eliminate discrimination exists.
The remedy must be restricted, however, to fulfilling the objective of
eradicating past discrimination, without unnecessarily interfering with
non-minority enjoyment of constitutional and statutory rights."
JULIA GRACE THIGPEN
121 See 448 U.S. at 478; text accompanying note 37 supra.
122 See 499 F. Supp. at 638; No. 77-2340-MC at A-5.
I" See 448 U.S. at 478 (marked disparity in percentage of public contract awards to
minority businesses held adequate evidence of past discrimination); 443 U.S. at 208
(employer may act in reponse to manifest racial imbalance in work force); note 62 supra.
12 See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. at 794-95 (Powell, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (choice of remedies to redress discrimination is in sound discre-
tion of trial court); Swann v. Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. at 15 (after finding violation of anti-
discrimination law, district court has broad power to remedy past discrimination).
1I A body designing a remedy for past discrimination which employs a racial quota
should consider the efficacy of alternative remedies, the planned duration of the racial
quota, the relationship between the percentage of minority group members and the percen-
tage of minorities in the relevant population or work force, and the availability of a waiver
provision in case the quota requirements are unattainable. See 448 U.S. at 510-11 (Powell,
J., concurring).
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